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Abstract: We report on the design and performance of a point-to-point
classical symmetric encryption link with fast key renewal provided by a
Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) system. Our
system was operational and able to encrypt point-to-point communications
during more than six months, from the end of July 2010 until the begin-
ning of February 2011. This field test was the first demonstration of the
reliability of a CVQKD system over a long period of time in a server room
environment. This strengthens the potential of CVQKD for information
technology security infrastructure deployments.
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1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] is among the first industrial applications of the field of
quantum information processing. Its natural commercial target is network security, since this
technology allows two distant parties to share a secret key through the exchange of quantum
states even in the presence of an eavesdropper, provided that the parties share an auxiliary
authenticated classical communication channel. Contrary to all known classical schemes, the
security of the established key can be proven without making any assumption on the capaci-
ties of the eavesdropper (for example computational power, knowledge of efficient algorithms,
amount of memory). In theory, this key can be combined with an information-theoretically se-
cure encryption method, the one-time pad (OTP), which requires a key that has to be as long as
the message. However, the latest long-term field demonstrations, the Tokyo QKD network [2]
and the SwissQuantum network [3], report a secret key rate lower than 1 Mbit/s, which makes
OTP incompatible with most of practical applications that require key rates above 1 Gbit/s. If
high bit rates are required, a practical solution is to use the keys issued from QKD to renew keys
used in classical symmetric algorithms like the FIPS Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [4].
Since each QKD key is completely independent of keys generated earlier, renewing keys forces
an attacker to perform a new attack to obtain the key after each renewal. This forward secrecy
property cannot be achieved with classical symmetric schemes. It can, however, be achieved
with classical asymmetric schemes but only under some complexity assumptions [5, 6].
In order to become an essential part of current network infrastructures, QKD systems have
to pass integrability and reliability tests. Systems that rely on encoding the information on
discrete variables, such as the phase or the polarization of single photons, have been widely
tested. Commercial products based on such systems have been developed by ID Quantique
[7] and MagiQ Technologies [8]. AES key renewal was demonstrated in [9], where the ID
Quantique QKD system was combined with an AES-based encryptor allowing to encrypt 1
Gbit/s communications, while the long-term reliability of this technology was tackled in [3]. In
comparison with QKD based on discrete variables, continuous-variable QKD (CVQKD), relies
on encoding the information on continuous variables such as the quadratures of coherent states
[10], that has been implemented in a great variety of situations [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24] (for a review of quantum information with continuous variables see [25]).
This has important practical advantages: the homodyne detection hardware does not require
any specific component, such as actively cooled single-photon detectors, and exhibits a better
compatibility with a Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) environment [26]. As recently
created companies, Quintessence Labs [27] and SeQureNet [28], pursue the development of a
new generation of CVQKD technologies, it is imperative to demonstrate the integrability and
reliability of CVQKD in a long-term field deployment.
We report here on the design and performance of the Symmetric Encryption with QUantum
key REnewal (SEQURE) project demonstration. In the context of this project, a point-to-point
Fig. 1. Map of the SEQURE demonstration. The two nodes are located in the cities of
Massy and Palaiseau in the southwest of Paris. The dashed line shows the 5 km straight
path between the two sites, whereas the actual length of the fiber is 17.7 km. ©Google
Maps - 2012
Length of fibre (km) Optical loss (dB)
17.7 5.6
Table 1. SEQURE demonstration link characteristics.
classical symmetric encryption link using keys provided by a CVQKD system was installed
in a production environment and ran during six months. This is the first demonstration of the
long-term stability of CVQKD.
2. SEQURE demonstration field test
2.1. Structure of the demonstration
We first discuss several important features of the SEQURE demonstration. The demonstration
involves two nodes located in:
• Palaiseau (Thales Research & Technology France)
• Massy (Thales Raytheon Systems)
The characteristics of the link are summarized in table 1 and a map is given in figure 1. For the
generation and management of the secret keys, we used the layered architecture (see figure 2)
Fig. 2. Layer structure of the SEQURE demonstration. The dashed bidirectional arrow
represents the fibre used for the Local Oscillator (LO) and the quantum signal, while the
plain arrow stands for the wavelength multiplexed classical signals: the reconciliation part
of the CVQKD, the key management layer and the encrypted traffic.
that was employed in the SECOQC FP6 European project network [29]. Note that the Tokyo
QKD network [2] and the SwissQuantum network [3] also used the same architecture. Its main
feature is that a layer of abstraction, the key management layer, is added between the physical
medium used for the QKD and the application layer that uses the produced keys to secure
classical communications. Then, it is straightforward to replace a QKD technology with another
and, in our case, to extend the SEQURE demonstration point-to-point setup to a multipoint
configuration.
In more detail, the SEQURE demonstration layers are the following:
• a quantum layer implemented with a CVQKD point-to-point link (developed jointly by
Thales Research & Technology and Institut d’Optique/CNRS [15, 19])
• a key management layer allowing to authenticate the reconciliation traffic of the quantum
layer and to provide symmetric keys to the application layer (this software was developed
by the Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT, formerly Austrian Research Center ARC)
during the SECOQC project [29])
• an application layer where the keys coming from the key management layer are used by
end users to encrypt their communications with a classical symmetric encryptor Mistral
Gigabit (developed by Thales Communications)
The physical layer of the link is composed of one pair of dark fibres. One fibre is used as
a quantum channel 1 and the other one is used to transmit all the classical channels. In the
SEQURE demonstration there were several types of classical channels:
• the channel for the reconciliation protocol of the QKD system
• the channel for cryptographic applications
• the channel for the monitoring of all the devices
A diagram of the components of the system is shown in figure 3.
1Note that in a CVQKD system there are two time-multiplexed physical channels on the optical fibre since a
classical signal, namely the local oscillator, is transmitted on the same fiber as the quantum signal.
Fibre 1:
2 VLANs
Fibre 2: signal and 
local oscillator
Optics
Computer: 
reconciliation
and key
management
1 Gb encryptor
(Thales)
Local network
Internet:
ssh access
100 Mb 
encryptor
(Thales)
Fig. 3. Structure of the SEQURE demonstration. The dashed lines correspond to the two
fibres. Fibre 1 is used for multiplexed classical communications, fibre 2 transmits the physi-
cal pulses that are used to establish the raw key. The colors correspond to the different types
of traffic: blue is plain text, black is the encrypted traffic VLAN, red is key renewal, orange
is optics control and raw key traffic, yellow is the control of Mistral products configuration,
purple is the Internet link, green is the monitoring traffic VLAN.
Since all the above classical channels need to operate in both directions, they are multiplexed
using WDM techniques. The wavelengths used are 1490nm (uplink) and 1310nm (downlink).
Standard GigaBit Interface Converters (GBIC) were used to convert ethernet optical signals
propagating in fibres into ethernet electric signals propagating in copper cables. The optical
fibres carrying the classical channels exhibited significant losses in the L-band; therefore Small
Form-Pluggable (SFP or Mini-GBIC) modules specified for a 40-km link (Prolabs GLC-BX-
D/U) were used. These modules were inserted into 8-port Cisco switches (WS-C2960G-8TC-
L) with one dual port. The different classical channels were realized using only one classical
link and multiplexing via Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs). One VLAN is used for the
reconciliation and the encrypted traffic, another VLAN is used to monitor all the devices.
The VLAN developed to monitor the demonstration was connected to a Management Center
located in Thales Research & Technology in Palaiseau. Remote accessibility to this manage-
ment center was provided by secure shell (ssh) connections allowed only for legitimate users.
In case of power cuts, rack-mounted remote-control power switches (ePowerSwitch) could
be used. They provide a secure web server interface allowing to switch on and off specific
devices.
2.2. The quantum layer
The quantum link is composed of a pair of optical devices, whose hardware description is
given in figure 4. This is a one-way implementation, where Alice sends to Bob 100 ns coherent
light pulses generated by a 1550 nm telecom laser diode pulsed at a frequency of 500 kHz.
These pulses are split into a weak signal and a strong local oscillator (LO) with an unbalanced
coupler. The implemented protocol uses Gaussian modulation of coherent states [10]: the signal
is randomly modulated following a centred Gaussian modulation in both quadratures, using an
amplitude and a phase modulator. The random numbers used for this modulation are provided
by Quantis, a physical Random Number Generator (RNG) from ID Quantique 2. The signal
pulses are then attenuated roughly by a variable attenuator and finely by a second amplitude
modulator, allowing to control the variance of the Gaussian distribution exiting Alice’s device.
2http://www.idquantique.com/true-random-number-generator/products-overview.html
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Fig. 4. Optical layout of the CVQKD prototype. Alice sends to Bob 100 ns coherent light
pulses generated by a 1550 nm telecom laser diode pulsed with a frequency of 500 kHz.
These pulses are split into a weak signal and a strong local oscillator (LO) with an unbal-
anced coupler. The signal pulse is modulated with a centered Gaussian distribution using
an amplitude and a phase modulator. The variance is controlled using a coarse variable at-
tenuator and a finely tuned amplitude modulator. The signal pulse is 400 ns delayed with
respect to the LO pulse using a 40 m delay line and a Faraday mirror. Both pulses are mul-
tiplexed with orthogonal polarization using a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS). The time and
polarization multiplexed pulses are then sent through the channel. They are demultiplexed
on Bob’s side with another PBS combined with active polarization control. A second delay
line on Bob’s side allows for time superposition of signal and LO pulses. After demul-
tiplexing, the signal and LO interfere on a shot-noise limited balanced pulsed homodyne
detector. A phase modulator on the LO path allows for random choice of the measured
signal quadrature.
The signal and LO are then transmitted through the optical fiber without overlap using time
and polarization multiplexing. One 400 ns delay line, composed of a 40-m single-mode fibre
followed by a Faraday mirror, is inserted into Alice’s signal path for the time multiplexing.
Polarization multiplexing is achieved by a polarization beam splitter (PBS) on Alice side. Both
pulses propagate through the fibre with orthogonal polarizations and a 400 ns time delay. They
are demultiplexed on Bob’s side with another PBS combined with active polarization control.
A second delay line on Bob’s side allows for time superposition of signal and LO pulses.
After demultiplexing, the signal and LO interfere on a shot-noise limited balanced pulsed
homodyne detector (HD). The electric signal coming from the HD is proportional to the signal
quadrature Xφ , where φ is the relative phase between the signal and the LO. Following the
protocol, by applying a pi/2 phase shift, the phase modulator on Bob’s LO path allows one to
measure randomly either X0 or Xpi/2.
Finally, feedback controls are implemented to allow for a stable operation of the system
over several months. Polarization drifts occurring in the quantum channel are corrected using
a dynamic polarization controller that finds an optimal polarization state at the output of the
channel. Temperature drifts affect lithium niobate, the active material used in the amplitude and
phase modulators, therefore the voltages that need to be applied to reach the target modulation
vary with temperature. The photodiode on Alice’s signal path is used for the feedback control of
the amplitude modulators while the HD output is sensitive to phase and can be used to control
the phase modulators.
It is important to note that the Gaussian modulation used in the implemented protocol [10]
maximizes the mutual information between Alice and Bob, thus offering an optimal theoret-
ical key rate against either individual [11] or collective [30, 31] attacks. However, it is hard
to reconcile correlated Gaussian variables with low signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). The limited
efficiency of the error-correcting codes (typically 0.90 bit extracted per bit theoretically avail-
able) results in a limit of the secure distance in the order of 30 km in our case. However, new
ideas have been proposed [32] and recently implemented [33] to increase the secret bit rate
and sequre distance, still keeping the Gaussian modulation which has presently the most robust
security proofs [30, 31].
With respect to the classical communication, four steps are required (see figure 2). First, a
Parameters Estimation (PE) step is needed to compute estimates of the physical parameters
linked to the exchange of quantum states through the quantum channel. These parameters are
the modulation variance VA, the transmission of the quantum channel T , and the excess noise
ξ . For some measured transmission and excess noise the modulation variance VA is adjusted in
order to optimize the secret key rate for a set of pairs (SNR, β ) (where SNR is the Signal to
Noise Ratio and β is the efficiency of the error-correction procedure) corresponding to the set
of available error-correcting codes [15]. The other parameters used to compute an estimate of
the secret information that can be extracted from the shared data, the electronic noise vel and
the efficiency of the homodyne detection η , are measured during a calibration procedure that
takes place before the deployment of the system and that is assumed to be performed in a secure
environment. For the SEQURE demonstration, the second step, which is the error correction
procedure, was based on a multilevel reconciliation algorithm using Low Density Parity Check
Codes (LDPC). This data reconciliation algorithm is explained in detail in [15]. The amount of
data revealed during this step is subtracted from the secret information previously computed.
The privacy amplification step described in [15] allows us to extract the secret information from
the identical strings shared by Alice and Bob after the error correction procedure. Finally, a key
verification step ensures with an overwhelming probability that Alice and Bob secret keys are
identical. This is simply done by revealing a small part of the final bits chosen at random.
3. Security considerations
The authentication of the classical channel needed for the QKD protocol is performed by the
cryptographic engine provided by the AIT software. A point-to-point authenticated channel is
created by the Q3P protocol. It is based on the Wegman-Carter scheme [34, 35]. This authenti-
cation protocol, like other QKD implementations, requires an initial common secret.
As for other families of QKD systems, some attacks can be implemented on a CVQKD
system exploiting the imperfections of the setup. For example, the presence of excess noise,
which is noise un excess of the shot noise, opens the possibility for partial intercept-resend
attacks as demonstrated in [36]. This is why the shot noise level on the receiver side must be
precisely known. Monitoring the physical parameters of the channel allows to upper-bound
the information available to Eve. An efficient way to perform quantum hacking (see [1]) on a
QKD system consists in exploiting side-channels. In our setup, a linear relationship between
the LO level and the shot noise is determined during the system calibration. Then the LO level
is continuously monitored with one photodiode of the HD and the shot noise level is computed
with the help of the previously calibrated relationship. It is used to convert in shot noise units
all the physical quantities needed to compute the amount of generated secret data. Generally,
the LO, which is a classical signal that can be manipulated by an eavesdropper, is a potential
vulnerability [37]. Monitoring the LO level is a counter-measure to such attacks.
4. Performance of the quantum layer
4.1. Events
The system was stable and ran continuously during more than 6 months, from the end of July
2010 to the beginning of February 2011. The optical part did not require any human interven-
tion during the full period of the demonstration. We list below the most significant problems
experienced during the demonstration:
• September 23 to September 29: the motherboard of Alice’s computer in Massy failed
and had to be changed (these two dates correspond to the two first marks on figure 5 and
figure 6). Error correction is the most demanding task in terms of computing power and
is performed on Alice’s side.
• October 1 to October 31: the server room in Massy (Alice’s side) was unavailable so the
experiment had to be interrupted until it was started again in a new location (these two
dates correspond to the two last marks on figure 5 and figure 6).
• November 1: the system was restarted but the experimental conditions became continu-
ously changing because of a lack of thermal regulation. However, the results could still
be exploited.
4.2. Excess noise
The excess noise was recorded during the full period of the experiment and is reported in
figure 5. On a daily scale, it is subject to variations linked to statistical fluctuations and experi-
mental conditions like fibre vibrations. Keys are mainly produced with low values of the excess
noise, while no keys are produced on blocks with a large excess noise because of the limited ef-
ficiency of the error correction scheme (about 90%, see [15]). The system operation was rather
stable during the 6 months but we can notice a significant difference in performance when the
experiment at one site was transferred from the server room to the room with no thermal reg-
ulation. In fact, the excess noise obtained with the equipment in these degraded experimental
conditions does not allow to obtain a positive secret key rate against collective attacks for the
line transmission [30, 31]. As a result, a secret key rate against individual attacks [11] only
was computed during the second part of the demonstration. This illustrates the importance of
monitoring continuously the excess noise in order to evaluate the security of the keys [36]. It
is important to note that this kind of problem is typical of an external environment and would
not occur in laboratory conditions. Our system was still able to produce keys in those degraded
conditions, although with an inferior performance. This illustrates the maturity of our setup.
4.3. Secret key rate
The keys generated by the quantum layer were used to refresh the Thales Mistral encryptors’
128-bit AES keys. The renewal period was 10 seconds, thus the quantum layer had to be able
to generate 8640 128-bit keys per day, which is roughly 1 Mbit of key material. Then, a 20
bit/s secret key rate would be sufficient. This rate is much lower than the rate up to 2 kbit/s
that our setup can produce with comparable line transmission and excess noise conditions [15].
The ultimate performances of our system were obtained using a multithread data processing
architecture with 2 cores devoted to the reconciliation and 1 core dedicated to the management
of the hardware part [19]. In the present case only one core is required to perform the reconcil-
iation, which results in an improved stability of the software and an improved stability of the
overall system over long periods. Figure 6 shows that the SEQURE demonstration was largely
above this threshold. Figure 5 shows that the key rate was about 600 bit/s (calculated against
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Fig. 5. In red, the secret key rate during the SEQURE demonstration. In green, the measured
excess noise during the SEQURE demonstration. During the first part (server room), this
excess noise can be mainly attributed to the acoustic noise in the server room. In the second
part, an additional excess noise occurred, that is attributed to thermal fluctuations due to the
lack of thermal regulation in the room. The black marks correspond to the events listed in
the section 4.1.
collective attacks) during the first part of the demonstration and 400 bit/s key rate (calculated
against individual attacks) during the second part.
5. Performance of the encryption layer
Several tests were performed in order to ensure that the key renewal did not affect the operation
of the encryptors. As no specific adaptation of the Thales Mistral products was performed for
the project, it was clear that the encryptors could not deal with a key renewal period lower
than 3 seconds. A 10 second period, as mentionned in the previous paragraph, was therefore
chosen as a security margin. This period could seem arbitrary but it ensures that no more then
235 bits are encrypted with the same key if we consider 1Gb/s data communications. This
can be compared with the best known attack [38] on the former encryption standard, the Data
Encryption Standard (DES), which requires 243 plaintext - ciphertext pairs, that is 249 bits of
observed traffic with known plaintext.
Classical networking applications like big files transfers (more than 1 Gbyte), disk sharing
and persistency of the network link were tested. In all cases, the performance of the Mistral
Gigabit was not affected by the key renewal.
6. Conclusion and perspectives
The SEQURE demonstration that we have presented shows that continuous-variable QKD can
compare well with discrete-variable QKD with respect to robustness and reliability in a server
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Fig. 6. In red, number of 128-bit keys per day produced during the SEQURE demonstra-
tion. In green, number of 128-bit keys per day required for a key renewal every 10 seconds.
The number of produced keys largely exceeds this limit. Before day 100, the keys were
produced assuming collective attacks from an eavesdropper. After day 100, they were com-
puted assuming only individual attacks because the excess noise was significantly higher.
The black marks correspond to the events listed in the section 4.1.
room environment, whose operating conditions are harder to cope with than laboratory ones.
Furthermore, it shows that CVQKD can be integrated easily with off-the-shelf network equip-
ments such as symmetric encryptors as a part of a more complex network infrastructure. Inte-
gration into WDM networks could be also eased by tolerance of the CVQKD homodyne detec-
tion scheme to incoherent noise [26]. Moreover, if CVQKD WDM compatibility is confirmed
in real optical network deployments, it will imply a significant decrease of the operational costs,
which can stimulate further interest for this technology.
The operating distance of the implemented system can be improved by the recent develop-
ments of better error-correcting codes [33] without any hardware modification. These codes
would also allow to produce keys secure against collective attacks even with the high values of
the excess noise obtained during the second part of the demonstration. For distances higher than
100 km, the key management layer developed within the SECOQC project can still be used to
share keys between two sites connected through several links.
As regards to the key rate, the current limitation of the system is not the optical part but
the error correction speed which can be drastically improved using Graphics Processing Units
(GPU) [15, 39]. Furthermore, in order to take into account finite-size effects it is necessary
to process large blocks (≥ 108 pulses) to extract the final key [40]. Then improving the error-
correction speed allows to deal with finite-size effects without dramatically increasing the key
production latency.
Finally, in a setting where QKD is used together with computational high-speed symmetric
encryption like in SEQURE, it is not unreasonable to use a scheme based on minimal assump-
tions about the security of symmetric cryptography, like the Lamport signature scheme instead
of using an initial secret key. This enables to initialize QKD with an exchange of authentic
values, which is easier to perform than an exchange of secret values [5].
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